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Political Order in Occupied Societies: Realist Lessons from Germany and Japan
by Thomas Berger

The American occupations of Germany and Japan have many lessons to offer the United States today as it contemplates creating new political orders in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lessons that are to be drawn are not, however, the ones that are usually drawn by the current administration and others. First and foremost, a systematic comparison with the German and Japanese experiences clearly shows that the preconditions for democratization are not present in the contemporary cases, suggesting that the United States needs to recalibrate its objectives. Instead of seeking democratization, the United States should try first to create stability, even as it creates at least the institutional forms on which a more pluralistic political system can eventually be erected. The U.S. experience with state building in the Philippines and South Korea may be more relevant today than the German and Japanese cases. Other lessons that can be drawn from the German and Japanese as well as other past U.S. experiences with occupying countries include: the importance of finding a common threat that can unite enough indigenous elites that order can be established; integrating the new states into regional systems; and perhaps most importantly, using the instruments of transitional justice (trials, purges, censorship, etc.) in a fashion calculated to rehabilitate and incorporate supporters of the old regimes while delivering a modicum of justice.

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The Future of the U.S.–Australian Security Relationship
by Rod Lyon and William T. Tow

The recent triumph of the Howard government at the polls confirms Australia's emergence as an increasingly important ally for the United States. It is willing to be part of challenging global missions, and its strong economy and growing self-confidence suggest a more prominent role in both global and regional affairs. Moreover, its government has worked hard to strengthen the link between Canberra and Washington. Political and strategic affinities between the two countries have been reflected in—and complemented by—practiced military interoperability, as the two allies have sustained a pattern of security cooperation in relation to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the last five years. This growing collaboration between the two countries suggests that a reinvention of the traditional bilateral security relationship is taking place. At the core of this process lies an agreement about the need for engaging in more proactive strategic behavior in the changing global security environment, and a mutual acceptance of looming military and technological interdependence. But this new alliance relationship has already tested the boundaries of bipartisan support for security policy within Australia, and will continue to do so despite the latest election results. Issues of strategic doctrine, defense planning, and procurement are becoming topics of fiercer policy debate. Such discussion is likely to be sharpened in the years ahead as Australia’s security relationship with the United States settles into a new framework.

Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900
by David C. Kang

Scholars in the field of international relations tend to treat the contemporary Asian system as if it emerged fully formed from nothingness in the post-World War II and post-colonial era. This essay explores a major historical epoch—the Asian international system from 1300 to 1900. During that time, the Asian international system was both intensive and extensive, in both interactions and relations between Asian states. Thus, understanding and incorporating this system into our theories of international relations is critical. To date, scholars have rarely described the main features of this system. In this article, I attempt such a task, and will also draw implications for mainstream international relations theories. In short, the research in this essay reveals that the historical Asian international system was stable and hierarchic in nature. The main theoretical finding is an alternative to the balancing proposition. That is, the findings in this article present a major empirical challenge to the argument that balance of power is a recurrent phenomenon across time and geography. Furthermore, this article shows that hierarchy may be more stable than balancing as an organizing principle in international relations.

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Worse Than a Monolith: Disorganization and Rivalry within Asian Communist Alliances and U.S. Containment Challenges, 1949–69
by Thomas J. Christensen

This article makes the counterintuitive argument that in the first two decades of the Cold War the communist alliance in East Asia was easiest for the United States and its allies to contain through coercive diplomacy during the period in which the communist alliance was most cohesive and unified under Soviet leadership (1954–57). With a focus on the Korean War and two Indochina Wars, this article shows how internal problems in the communist alliance significantly complicated the containment of communism. In the formative years of the East Asian communist alliances (1950–53), the alliance’s lack of organization and cohesion made it more difficult for anti-communist forces in the region to deter communist expansion and to control escalation of wars once they started. Between 1958–69, internal rivalry for leadership in the communist alliance made containment of the alliance particularly difficult for the United States and its allies. Until the Chinese and Soviet communists actually turned their guns on each other in early 1969, the Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership of the international communist movement in the 1960s only served to increase the expansionist fervor of the communist movement as a whole, make peace agreements with anti-communist forces in the region more difficult, and maximize the amount of military assistance local revolutionaries, like Ho Chi Minh, received from both Moscow and Beijing.